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ABSTRACT 
Unconventional oil and gas extraction (UOGE) has spurred an unprecedented boom in on-shore 
production in the U.S.  Despite a surge in related research, a void exists regarding policy-related 
inquiries.  To address this gap, we examine support of federal regulatory exemptions for UOGE 
using survey data collected in 2015 from two northern Colorado communities as part of a 
National Institutes of Health study. We assert that current regulatory exemptions for UOGE can 
be understood as components of broader societal processes of neoliberalization.  We test whether 
free market ideologies relate to people’s regulatory views and find that free market ideology 
increases public support for federal regulatory exemptions for UOGE.  We find that perceived 
negative impacts do not necessarily drive people to support increased federal regulation. 
Utilizing neo-Polanyian theory, we tested for an interaction between free market ideology and 
perceived negative impacts (Block and Somers 2014; Author 2015). Interestingly, free market 
ideology appears to moderate people’s views of regulation. Free market ideology seems to 
increase the effect of perceived negative impacts while simultaneously increasing support for 
deregulation. We conclude with a nuanced theoretical discussion to analyze how free market 
ideology might normalize the impacts of UOGE activity.  
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INTRODUCTION 
Unconventional oil and gas extraction (UOGE)—executed via a combination of vertical drilling, 
directional drilling, and hydraulic fracturing (or fracking)— has spurred an unprecedented boom 
in domestic oil and gas production. Proponents claim that UOGE will create jobsand  energy 
independence while reducing greenhouse gas emissions (Driessen 2013; Energy from Shale 
2015). However, economic and job growth related to UOGE is relatively modest (Kinnaman 
2011), and most direct jobs go to people from outside host communities (Wrenn, Kelsey and 
Jaenicke 2015). Emerging evidence suggests that UOGE can strain local infrastructure (Graham 
et. al. 2015), have negative environmental impacts (Holzman 2011; Ferrar et. al. 2013; Paulik et. 
al. 2015), and damage public health (Colborn et. al. 2011; Perry 2012; Hill 2014; Rabinowitz et. 
al. 2015).  
Social scientists have responded to the boom by conducting a number of studies examining 
general perceptions of UOGE (Boudet et. al. 2014; Clarke et.al. 2015; Crowe, Ceresola and Silva 
2015), beliefs about its positive and negative impacts (Jacquet 2012; Schafft, Borlu and Glenna 
2013), and quality of life related to unconventional oil and gas extraction (Willow 2015).  
Yet, a void exists in our knowledge of UOGE’s policy-related aspects, even as deregulation has 
left states and cities to formulate their own idiosyncratic policy responses..  This is especially 
important to examine, since the boom in UOGE in the U.S. can be attributed in part to the 
industry’s exemptions from comprehensive federal environmental regulations (Kraft, Stephen 
and Abel 2011; Nolon and Gavin 2013; Warner and Shapiro 2013). Yet, we still know very little 
about how people living in t the UOGE boom perceive industry exemptions fromfederal 
environmental. We also know very little about how this relates to people’s overarching political 
and economic ideologies, particularly to views on free markets. As decision-makers debate the 
appropriate level of governance for UOGE, and as citizens in boom states like Colorado contend 
with the environmental and social consequences of drilling, this knowledge is sorely needed.  
To address this gap, we examine support for federal regulatory exemptions for UOGE. . We 
utilize our survey data collected from two communities in northern Colorado as part of a 
National Institutes of Health study on UOGE impacts. To the best of our knowledge, no study 
has yet examined what drives public support of regulatory exemptions for UOGE. Further, our 
focus on public perceptions of people living in northern Colorado allows us to extend the 
literature, which has an abundance of data drawn from the Marcellus Shale region in the eastern 
U.S. Colorado needs this systematic social scientific attention, with roughly 55,000 active oil and 
gas wells (COGCC 2015).  
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In this paper, we assert that current regulatory exemptions for UOGE can be understood as 
components of broader societal processes of neoliberalization, thereby moving the industry away 
from traditional state-based regulation and towards market-based re-regulation.  . Further, we 
expand neo-Polanyian theory (Block and Somers 2014; Author 2015) by relating northern 
Colorado outcomes to these broader processes of neoliberalization. We use our survey data to 
test for relationships between Coloradoans’ free market ideologies and their support for federal 
regulatory exemptions. Public support for the neoliberalization of oil and gas policy may hinge 
upon free market ideology, but this has not been tested.  
Below, we describe the current literature on public perceptions related to hydraulic fracturing 
and other aspects of UOGE, offer a primer on Polanyian theory and neoliberalism, and present 
relevant findings from our NIH-funded survey, conducted simultaneously in two communities— 
one with active extraction and the other with a moratorium on drilling within city limits..  
 
EMPIRICAL AND THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
Regulatory and Attitudinal Contexts Surrounding Unconventional Oil and Gas Extraction 
(UOGE) 
Historically, regulatory oversight of the oil and gas industry in the U.S. was concentrated at the 
federal level, particularly as production ramped up in the early part of the 20th century (Anderson 
2012). More recently, federal-level environmental and health regulations for the oil and gas 
(O&G) industry have been deregulated and devolved to state enforcement through a series of 
clauses, exemptions, and amendments to federal regulations. These include: the 1976 Resource 
Conservation and Recovery Act, which now makes special exceptions for waste storage and 
disposal related to O&G production; the 1980 Comprehensive Environmental Response, 
Compensation, and Liability Act (Nolon and Gavin 2013), which excludes many petroleum and 
O&G products from definitions of hazardous waste; and exclusion from the Toxic Release 
Inventory Reporting requirements in that portion of the Emergency Planning and Community 
Right-to-Know Act (Kraft, Stephen and Abel 2011).  
Perhaps the most notorious exemption is the so-called “Halliburton Loophole” embedded in the 
2005 Energy Policy Act that exempted the O&G industry from various reporting requirements of 
the Safe Drinking Water Act, the Clean Water Act, and a suite of other federal environmental 
regulations (Warner and Shapiro 2013). Despite recent attempts to enact federal regulations for 
UOGE occurring on federal (public) lands governed by the Bureau of Land Management (BLM), 
several states and industry interests have taken this issue to court, saying that federal regulations 
unnecessarily replicate state laws. Thus, oversight has largely been devolved to the states, which 
have struggled to develop adequate regulatory responses to UOGE. The current regulatory 
environment is inherently fragmentary (Davis 2012; Rabe 2014; Zirogiannis et. al. 2016).  
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Populations familiar with UOGE hold an array of complex views about its threats and 
opportunities. Rural Pennsylvanians perceive benefits like job growth, economic development 
and increased tax revenue, yet also express concern about water pollution, public health, and 
nuisances like noise and dust (Brasier et. al. 2011; Jacquet 2012; Jacquet and Stedman 2013;). 
Residents of Louisiana (Ladd 2013, 2014), Texas (Anderson and Theodori 2009; Theodori 
2009), and Ohio (Willow 2015) hold similarly conflicting views about risks and benefits.  
While perceptions related to UOGE activity in the eastern U.S.’ Marcellus region have been 
thoroughly documented, there is little research on people’s views in the West, specifically related 
to Coloradoans’ perceptions. There is also little research on public views of federal UOGE 
regulations. Both are important gaps in knowledge.  
Polanyian Economic Theory and Neoliberal Capitalism 
The work of economic historian Karl Polanyi (1944) has become increasingly relevant for 
contemporary social scientists analyzing effects of neoliberal capitalism (Dale 2010, 2016; Block 
and Somers 2014). For Polanyi, markets are ‘always embedded’ in social ties and cultural 
systems; that is, markets are immersed in and emerge from complex, long-term socio-cultural 
and institutional arrangements and reciprocal systems of social exchange. Markets are not 
autonomous entities; rather, they are constructed over time within social norms, relationships, 
and institutions. In fact, economic relations are so embedded in social life that when free market 
policies attempt to dis-embed markets from social protections, people experience social 
dislocation as their daily lives become less predictable, increasingly unstable, and less guarded 
by regulatory systems (Polanyi 1944; 2001). Dis-embedded and/ or de-regulated markets that 
encourage corporate ‘self-regulation’ aggrandize people’s social dislocation because these 
markets depend on rapid exchanges of fictitious commodities—like land, labor, and money—
which are inherently unstable when traded as commodities in market-based systems (Polanyi 
1944; Block 2008).  
As self-regulating, dis-embedded markets cause deep social dislocations, people experience 
elevated risks and insecurity related to unsafe workplaces, environmental contamination, or 
abuses of labor amid de- and re-regulation. These experiences of dislocation result in the double 
movement—whereby people mobilize to fight the destabilizing impacts of free market 
capitalism. The double movement mobilizes through “the varying support of those most 
immediately affected by the deleterious action of the market,” and outcomes involve collectively 
“using protective legislation, restrictive associations, and other instruments of intervention” 
(Polanyi 1944:138-139). Double movement activists typically target the state for social 
protections, as with U.S. movements for federal environmental protection and child labor laws 
(Dale 2010).  
Polanyi’s view of market economies become complicated when applied to current neoliberal 
systems of capitalism. These current systems have unique socio-cultural discourses and impacts, 
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helping shape what Block and Somers (2014) call ‘social naturalism’ – people’s increasingly 
common ideological belief in free ‘market fundamentalism.’ Social naturalism holds that “the 
laws of the market are no different from the biological self-regulatory organisms of nature” 
(Block and Somers 2014: 6) and suggests that markets produce socially, economically, and 
environmentally optimal outcomes that are the ‘natural’ workings of the free market. Dis-
embedded markets become normalized, in other words. Because this system maps closely on to 
American values of individualism and private property, neoliberal discourses have become 
hegemonic in the U.S. (Harvey 2005). But how is the double movement changed or re-
constituted in neoliberalized spaces like the U.S.? This latter question has been under-explored. 
Here, neoliberalism refers to policies enacted since the late 1970s in the US and UK and 
subsequently adopted globally – policies  characterized by widespread subordination of 
productive sectors to financial ones (Castree 2008). Neoliberalism typically involves massive 
reductions in the federal state’s role, including privatization of state-owned natural resources, 
state-run directives, and devolution of governance from federal to state or municipal levels or to 
civil society in the interest of ‘slimming down’ the central state (Castree 2008; Harvey 2007). 
Issues that were once federal responsibilities—ranging from enforcement of immigration policy 
to social services— are increasingly delegated to states or private agencies.  
Neoliberalism treats market systems as regulators of states (rather than vice-versa) and has 
transformed the ethos of governance from bureaucracy to business.  Neoliberalism manifests 
primarily as a moral project that normalizes logics of individualism and entrepreneurialism; it 
equates freedom with consumption and self-interest, redefining citizens as consumers (Mudge 
2008).  
 
Yet, neoliberalism is qualitatively different from both liberalism and so-called “American” 
values that parallel it. First, neoliberalism envisions a more limited state role than even the most 
conservative programs pre-1970s. Second, geographical implications of neoliberalism differ 
from liberalism or American individualism, as it is promoted and accepted among global elites 
(Harvey 2007). Additionally, freedom is conceptualized as capacity for self-realization and 
freedom from bureaucracy—rather than freedom from want—and human behavior is therefore 
understood from individualized, economized perspectives (Leitner, Peck, and Sheppard 2007). 
Neoliberalism is therefore as much a social and ideological project as an economic one, a 
“hegemonic restructuring ethos” (Peck et al. 2010:104) of society.   
Environmental activism deserves specific attention. Polanyi identified environmental 
degradation as a central problem of free market systems. However, neo-Polanyians do not 
adequately analyze environmental activism as part of the double movement (e.g. Randles 2007; 
Dale 2010; Polanyi-Levitt 2013). For example, sociologists have shown how natural resource 
markets are embedded in a complex array of social relations, policies, and institutional 
arrangements (Kaup 2015), which help mobilize divergent responses to regulation and social 
impacts certain of those markets (Author 2015).  Yet, there has been little connection between 
164-051	
6	
	
Polanyian theorizing and analyses of environmental activism. While social movement 
scholarship has highlighted resistance to toxic industries or environmental harms (e.g. Devine-
Wright and Howes 2010; McAdam and Boudet 2012; Bogdan et. al. 2015), such activism has not 
been regarded as part of the double movement. Further, the power of market-based economic 
ideologies in blunting public resistance to highly industrialized or hazardous sites has been 
under-analyzed.  
A few studies attempt to connect environmental activism and Polanyian theory, particularly 
where activists diverge from predicted models. Author (2015) utilizes fieldwork in uranium 
communities to characterize ‘sites of acceptance,’ where people mobilize to support socially or 
environmentally risky industries. Finewood and Stroup (2012) argue that market-based logics 
have attenuated the regulatory response to UOGE in Pennsylvania. In a study of Pennsylvania 
farmers with natural gas leases, Author (2014) found that farm operators displayed economic 
rationality akin to Block and Somers’ market fundamentalism through a neoliberalized 
discursive framing that normalized the rapid expansion of local drilling. More broadly, 
controversies around potentially risky industrial or extractive facilities are often tempered by 
strong free market ideologies, which use economic outcomes like jobs and economic growth as 
carrots incentivizing growth (Shriver and Kennedy 2005; Messer, Adams and Shriver 2012; 
Ladd 2014).  
With these oversights, orthodox Polanyian theory ignores the power and durability of free market 
ideology (Block and Somers 2014), particularly in environmental contexts. Author (2015) 
suggests that public support for socio-ecologically risky industries is a  ‘triple movement”;	rather 
than mobilizing to demand social protections from dis-embedded markets, some will support the 
further dis-embedding of markets and oppose efforts to regulate industries.  
 
This article empirically tests the assertion that a different kind of public response to social 
dislocation privileges dis-embedded, self-regulating markets. Free market ideology has been 
identified as an important predictor of a range of environmental attitudes. Across different 
samples, researchers have shown that free market ideology is associated with disbelief in climate 
change (Heath and Gifford 2006; Lewandowksy and Oberaurer 2013; Cook and Jacobs 2014) 
and low general environmental concern (Jackson et. al. 2013). Similarly, Longo and Baker 
(2014) show that people who support deregulation have less environmental concern. Taken 
together, these studies indicate that free market ideology reduces concern for environmental 
well-being and support for environment regulation. The theoretical and sociological significance 
of this in the UOGE context must still be studied.  
Other predictors of environmental policy support 
In this section, we discuss other possible predictors of regulatory views. As we describe in the 
methods section, we control for these possible influences to avoid omitted variable bias.   
164-051	
7	
	
Trust in regulatory authorities has been found to increase support for progressive environmental 
regulations (Konisky, Milyo and Richardson 2008; Harring 2013, 2014; Zannakis et. al. 2015). 
Trust in regulators is especially important in Colorado, where the main regulatory agency, the 
Colorado Oil and Gas Conservation Commission (COGCC), simultaneously enforces regulations 
and advocates for increased development to support economic growth. In this dual role, the 
COGCC appears to favor industry (Cook 2014, 2015; Opsal and Shelley 2014).  
Proximity to UOGE activities might also	relate to regulatory views in several complex ways. For 
instance, familiarity with a technology or industry generally lessens perceptions of risk related to 
that technology or industry (Fishchoff et. al. 1978; Slovic et. al. 1980). Media and community 
leaders also impact framing and public perceptions (Kasperson et. al. 1988; Zavestoski et. al. 
2004; Auyero and Swinstun; 2008). Hence, respondents who live near harmful facilities may 
normalize risk and /or might not necessarily be more likely to endorse regulation. 
Political ideology or affiliation can also profoundly influence people’s support for environmental 
policies, their environmental behavior, and general environmental attitudes (Mohai and Bryant 
1998; Hamilton 2008; McCright 2011; McCright and Dunlap 2011). In the case of fracking , 
political conservatives are generally more supportive of expanding drilling (Boudet et. al. 2014; 
Clarke et. al. 2015; Crowe, Ceresola and Silva 2015).  
Finally, public attitudes towards environmental and technological issues vary by socio-
demographic variables like age, race, socio-economic status and gender (Flynn, Slovic and Mertz 
1994; Finucane et al. 2000; Shelley, Chiricos and Gertz 2011), so we have controlled for these in 
the models presented below. 
Hypotheses 
The theoretical framework sketched above indicates that free market ideology may be a key 
overlooked variable in the case of public perceptions of UOGE activity. Specifically, qualitative 
research indicates that UOGE is framed in terms of its economic benefits and some believe that 
the expansion of UOGE is a market-driven, inevitable process (Author 2014). Further, a ‘triple 
movement’ dynamic may exist in that extractive community members support deregulation. 
Following this framework, we test the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1: Free market ideology will increase support for exemptions from federal 
regulations for UOGE activity.  
As noted above, people living near hydraulic fracturing and other phases of UOGE report an 
array of impacts, both positive and negative (e.g. Braiser et. al. 2011; Jacquet 2012; Jacquet and 
Stedman 2013). It is likely that people who associate hydraulic fracturing with negative impacts 
will favor comprehensive regulations. While this has not yet been tested in the literature on 
hydraulic fracturing, studies have shown that perceived risk in other areas, such as climate 
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change, does predict policy support (O’Connor et. al. 1999; Leiserowitz 2006). Thus, we 
additionally expect that:  
Hypothesis 2: Perceived negative impacts from UOGE activity will increase support for 
federal regulation of it.  
The ‘social naturalism’ concept described above suggests that free market ideology helps 
normalize environmental risks from industrial development, enhancing public support for 
expanding potentially risky industries. This suggests that, among people who report holding free 
market ideologies, these views may temper public perceptions of risks related to hydraulic 
fracturing. In other words, we suggest that while individuals possessing free market ideologies 
may very well perceive a number of risks from UOGE activity or even witness personal or 
community harm, normalization of these risks means they do not mobilize the sorts of double 
movement activism that Polanyi suggested. Rather, as Author’s (2015) triple movement 
framework suggests, free market ideology moderates the effect of perceived negative impacts. 
Thus, we test the following hypothesis:   
Hypothesis 3: Free market ideology will ‘normalize’ the impacts of UOGE activity. The 
effect of perceived negative impacts upon support for federal exemptions will be moderated 
by free market ideology.  
Methods, Measures, and Data 
Data Collection Methods 
This two-year study is funded by the National Institutes of Health. Our research team utilized a 
unique comparative design. Data was collected from two communities in northern Colorado in 
Spring 2015; these communities were selected due to their varying levels of oil and gas activity.   
The first community, Fort Collins, Colorado, is a relatively affluent city of about 156,000 whose 
economy centers on a large, research-intensive land grant university, hospitals, and various tech 
firms (ACS 2015a). At the time of survey data collection, there was very little oil and gas drilling 
within the city limits, and several miles separated our respondents’ homes from the nearest wells. 
In 2013, city residents voted for a moratorium on UOGE, though this is currently under appeal in 
state court. 
The study’s second community is Greeley, Colorado. Greeley has about 99,000 residents and its 
economy centers on industrial agriculture, oil and gas extraction, and a medium sized university. 
(Chamber of Commerce 2016). At the time of data collection, roughly 21,000 oil and gas wells 
were actively being drilled in Greeley’s home county (COGCC 2015), with dozens of wells in 
close proximity to our respondents.  
Our sampling frame for Greeley was a census tract near a well pad with three active wells and 
seven additional pending permits for new wells. The study site was chosen by first identifying 
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permitted wells within city limits, then narrowing our search to well pads with additional permits 
pending. Site visits were then conducted to identify the most appropriate site with close 
proximity to residential areas. Once this well pad location was selected, we identified the most 
proximate census tract from which to sample. In Fort Collins, we selected a comparable census 
tract, with socio-demographic similarities to the Greeley site, except that the Fort Collins 
location was relatively insulated from UOGE activity. From these tracts, we drew a random 
sample of 1400 households, 700 per community, to participate in the study.  
Data collection was done via a mixed-mode, modified tailored design approach (Dillman et al. 
2014). Two waves of mail surveys were distributed, with reminder postcards mailed between the 
two survey mailings. The third round utilized drop-off/pick-up methods (Steele et. al. 2001) in 
which households were contacted up to six times, in an attempt to retrieve a completed survey 
instrument from every location. The nearest birthday method was used to screen respondents 
within households. A total of 458 surveys were collected, for a response rate of 32%. 164 people 
from Greeley and 294 people from Fort Collins participated.1 
Importantly, Colorado has a long history of O&G production, centered in the same oil-rich areas 
of the state, making the industry familiar to long-time residents. Colorado’s first successfully 
drilled well was completed in 1860 outside Colorado Springs (Colorado Energy Office 2013).  
The first refinery was built in 1885.  Production in Colorado exploded at the turn of the century, 
particularly on the Western Slope and Denver-Julesburg Basin, increasing from 200 barrels per 
day in 1885 to over 2 billion barrels per day by the late 1920s (Colorado Energy Office 2013). 
Additional booms have occurred in the 1970s, in the 1990s, and again from about 2009-2015, as 
UOGE activity and booming oil prices created the most recent surge. 
Measures 
Dependent Variable.  The dependent variable assessed respondents’ support for federal 
deregulation, such as the “Halliburton Loophole,” utilizing the following statement: 
 “The oil and gas industry should be exempt from federal environmental regulations.” 
Respondents could answer on a Likert scale, from “Strongly Agree” to “Strongly Disagree”. (We 
recoded this variable so that 3=Strongly Agree and Agree, 2= Neither Agree or Disagree, 1= 
Disagree or Strongly Disagree for ease of interpretation.) As shown in Figure 1, only 11% of 
strongly agreed or agreed with the statement, while 53% reported strong disagreement 
<Figure 1 about here>.  
																																								 																				
1	There are several reasons why Fort Collins residents were more apt to respond than Greeley residents. For 
example, the largest employer in Fort Collins is a university and the town has a high number of people with 
advanced degrees; we speculate that these individuals have a higher propensity to respond. 	
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Focal Independent Variables.  Free market ideology was assessed through questions 
adapted from both Heath and Gifford (2006) and Life and Transition II study (ECB 2015). These 
items were combined into a scale with Cronbach’s Alpha = 0.75 and with a mean of 2.6, with 
higher values corresponding to greater free market ideology.  
Perceived negative impacts from UOGE development were measured by asking respondents to 
assess the following quality of life impacts of UOGE activity in their community: increased 
traffic on main roads, increased traffic on secondary/ rural roads, noise around oil and gas 
facilities, light around oil and gas facilities, diminished water quality at home, diminished water 
quality in the environment, diminished access to water, and reduced control over land. Responses 
to these questions were combined into an additive scale with Cronbach’s Alpha = 0.93 and 
mean=1.95. Appendix 1 provides question wordings for these items.  
Control Variables. Trust in state regulators was assessed via four survey questions in which 
respondents gauged the COGCC’s capacity and ability to adequately enforce regulations and the 
Colorado Department of Public Health and Environment’s ability to protect human and 
environmental health. These were combined into an additive scale with alpha = 0.90, a mean of 
3.05 and a standard deviation of 1.06 (higher values correspond to more trust in state regulators).  
We control for political affiliation (0= not republican, 1= republican), proximity to UOGE (0= 
Fort Collins, 1= Greeley), race/ethnicity (0=non-white, 1=white), household income (0= less 
than $24,000, 1=$35,000-$50,000, 2=$50,000 to $80,000, 3=$80,000 or more), education (0= 
less than HS, 1= high school graduate, 2= associates or some college, 3= college graduate, 4= 
graduate degree or more), age in years, and sex (0=male, 1=female). Means and standard 
deviations for all predictors can be found in Table 1, organized by community. Greeley residents 
have somewhat lower incomes and perceive more oil and gas impacts than Fort Collins residents.  
<Table 1 about here> 
Statistical Models. We employ ordinal logistic regression to accommodate the ordinal nature of 
our outcome variable. Model 1 includes our control variables for socio-demographics, trust and 
location. In Model 2, we add the impact variables and the free market ideology scale. In Model 
3, we test for whether free market ideology moderates perceived oil and gas impacts by adding 
an interaction between these variables. To assess model fit, we report two pseudo R2 statistics—
the first was developed by McKelvey and Zavoina (1975) and the second is described in Lacy 
(2006)—and Akaike Information Criteria (AIC) and Bayesian Information Criteria (BIC) 
statistics. We examined multicollinearity diagnostics and no variance inflation factor exceeded 
1.5, indicating that multicollinearity is not a problem in our models.  
Results  
As shown in Table 2, Model 1 includes only socio-demographic controls and, for the most part, 
these variables have relatively little influence – though more educated individuals are slightly 
less supportive of federal exemptions. In this model, trust in state regulators reduces support for 
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federal exemptions (b= 0.320, p<.05). Income, age, political affiliation, location, and 
race/ethnicity appear to have relatively little impact.  
<Table 2 about here> 
Model 2 introduces the free market ideology and perceived impact scales to test Hypotheses 1 
and 2. Consistent with Hypothesis 1, we find that individuals who advocate free market 
ideologies are more likely to endorse exempting the O&G industry from federal regulations 
(b=0.841, p<.05). Support for exemptions increases as negative perceptions of UOGE activity’s 
impacts rise. This surprising finding runs counter to Hypothesis 2, as we expected perceived 
impacts to reduce support for exemptions. The introduction of free market ideology and impacts 
has attenuated the effect of trust and, as in the prior model, the socio-demographic controls and 
location appear to be relatively unimportant.  
Model 3 tests Hypothesis 3 by including an interaction between free market ideology and 
perceived impacts. Here, the main effect of perceived impacts (i.e. the effect of perceived 
impacts when free market ideology is equal to zero) is statistically significant, as is the main 
effect of free market ideology is (b=1.244 when impacts are set to zero). The interaction term, 
while not statistically significant, suggests that as free market ideology increases, the effect of 
perceived impacts on people’s views of (de)regulation wanes (and vice versa). In other words, 
free market ideology moderates the effect of perceived impacts from the UOGE industry on 
people’s support for federal regulatory exemptions by intensifying the effect of perceived 
impacts on support for deregulation. However, the inclusion of the interaction terms has not 
improved model fit—the pseudo R2 statistics have barely improved and both the AIC and BIC 
suggest worse model fit than the prior model. These findings provide qualified support for 
Hypothesis 3.  
To further understand the modeling results, we calculated average marginal effects (AMEs) for 
impacts across different levels of free market ideology using the coefficients from Model 3; these 
average marginal effects are plotted in Figure 2. The AMEs largely corroborate the results 
reported in Table 2. As free market ideology increases, the AME of impacts grows in tandem – 
—thus, individuals who adhere to strong free market ideology while also perceiving strong 
negative quality of life impacts are most likely to support federal exemptions. Still, in practical 
terms the degree of moderation is small.  
<Figure 2 about here> 
Discussion & Conclusions 
The purpose of this paper was to understand how citizens embedded in neoliberal systems of 
governance view deregulation in the context of UOGE activity. In this section, we discuss the 
empirical and theoretical significance of our results and suggest future research needs.  
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We find unambiguous support for Hypothesis 1. Across all model specifications, we find that 
free market ideology increases public support for federal regulatory exemptions for the O&G 
industry (in other words, support for deregulation). This effect survives the inclusion of an array 
of control variables, suggesting that free market ideology is an important and too often 
overlooked predictor of the public’s policy preferences. The presence of free market ideology 
may indeed indicate the hegemonic power of neoliberal ideology in societies like the U.S. 
(Harvey 2007). These results are consistent with research documenting the impact of free market 
ideology on people’s belief in climate change (Health and Gifford 2006; Lewandowsky et. al. 
2013). Indeed, because free market ideology appears to impact a diverse array of variables 
ranging from UOGE regulations to climate change attitudes, it warrants further attention in 
future research.  
Hypothesis 2 is not supported by this analysis. Perceived negative impacts do not drive people to 
support federal regulation. Counter to our hypothesis, we find that people who perceive more 
negative impacts from UOGE are less supportive of federal regulation or, alternatively, more 
likely to endorse federal deregulation.  
However, the moderation model estimated to test Hypothesis 3 (Model 3) provides more nuanced 
interpretation of the effect of perceived negative impacts. Due to social naturalism, we suspected 
that free market ideology would blunt the effect of perceived negative impacts. While we do find 
evidence that the effect of perceived negative impacts on regulatory support is to some degree 
conditioned by free market ideology, conditioning is not in the expected direction. Free market 
ideology appears to moderate perceptions of negative impacts, but, surprisingly, it increases the 
effect perceived negative impacts have on people’s expressed support for deregulation—though 
in practical terms the degree of moderation is small.  
This unexpected finding warrants further discussion. In our data, perceiving that UOGE activity 
creates negative impacts appears to increase support for federal deregulation. This is surprising, 
especially when we consider that research related to climate change has shown that heightened 
perceived impacts increase policy support (e.g. Leiserowitz 2006), or support for strengthened 
state regulations.  
Perhaps findings related to climate change cannot be generalized to the case of policy related to 
UOGE activity in Colorado. Unlike climate change, which is often perceived as a distant 
problem for future generations, residents of the Colorado communities under study have 
familiarity and, often, daily experiences with UOGE activity. Well pads, pipeline routes, and 
industry infrastructure are in close proximity to homes, businesses, schools and public spaces, 
especially in Greeley. Many people are employed, directly or indirectly, by the industry. It is 
likely that, in addition to UOGE’s visual presence in the community, some respondents will have 
personal connections to the industry. In this context, people willingly tolerate quality of life or 
environmental impacts because of the perceived economic benefits of UOGE activity or personal 
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ties to industry employees, making individuals’ responses to UOGE activity quite different from 
their responses to climate change.  
We assert, however, that these outcomes highlight the hegemonic power of neoliberal capitalism 
in political economies such as the U.S., where it becomes normal to privilege deregulated 
economic development above socio-environmental or quality of life considerations. The 
seemingly surprising relationships discussed above, then, seem to highlight and support our 
overarching theoretical proposition that a triple movement now co-exists with a double 
movement in neoliberal political economies like the U.S.   
It seems that rather than trusting the federal government to address negative outcomes from 
UOGE operations, people may instead prefer state-level officials to regulate UOGE or for the 
industry to self-regulate. This outcome may relate to respondents’ general distrust in the federal 
government, which is a common and well-evidenced public sentiment in the American West 
(e.g., Limerick 1987; Reisner 1993; Krannich and Smith 1998). Even if people perceived the 
O&G industry as increasing risk or negatively impacting their communities or daily lives, they 
may blame these outcomes on the federal government, rather than on the self-regulating 
corporations or on the state-level institutions actually enforcing regulations.  
However, in unreported models, we constructed an index measuring people’s trust in federal and 
state capacities to regulate, and when we controlled for these factors, we saw no change in the 
relationship between perceived negative impacts and support for federal deregulation. Thus, it 
seems that some people may simply trust industry to regulate its own performance, rather than 
assigning that governance role to the federal government. People’s free market ideologies would 
only enhance this view because private or public-private approaches to regulation have become 
privileged and preferred methods of organization.2 Understanding the nuanced relationships 
between these different aspects of trust, and how they relate to people’s overarching views on 
economic structures and regulatory responsibilities, is an important task for future research.3 
																																								 																				
2	One alternative explanation is that some individuals might prefer that regulatory power concentrate at 
the local level and hence support federal exemptions. To investigate this possibility, we correlated our DV 
with two other variables: 1) asking if localities should have the right to pass stricter regulation on UOGE 
activity and 2) asking if localities should be able to relax existing UOGE regulations. Using polychoric 
correlations, we observed that support for local regulation of UOGE has a positive correlation with 
support for federal exemptions (rho=.35) while those who support increased local regulation are not 
supportive of federal exemptions (rho=-.29). Hence, it appears that support for federal exemptions is not 
likely a function of preference for local regulation.	
3	Perhaps most surprising is political affiliation’s lack of influence on people’s views, given prior findings 
about political conservatism acting as a strong predictor of attitudes towards environmental issues (e.g. 
Mohai and Bryant 1998; McCright and Dunlap 2011), including hydraulic fracturing (Boudet et. al. 2014; 
Clarke et. al. 2015; Crowe, Ceresola and Silva 2015). However, this paper is one of the few to examine a 
specific UOGE policy. Other research has assessed general support using national samples (Boudet et. al. 
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Despite the drastic differences in the level of UOGE activity when comparing Greeley and Fort 
Collins, we find that Fort Collins residents are only slightly less supportive of federal regulatory 
exemptions, and this effect does not approach statistical significance in any model specifications. 
Greeley and other rural areas of northeastern Colorado have a long history of extractive activity. 
Perhaps because of the historical significance of extractive industries, as well as the long-term 
presence of large-scale agriculture, drilling has become normalized. That is, our Greeley sample 
may be desensitized to large-scale UOGE activity because it is seen as a part of both their daily 
lives and collective history. This interpretation is in line with other research into the community 
response to environmental hazards (e.g. Kasperson et. al. 1988; Auyero and Swinstun 2007; 
2008; 2009), which suggests that the mere presence of socially or ecologically harmful activity is 
unlikely to generate a public response. For our Fort Collins sample, an influx of new residents 
who may be unaware of the extensive drilling activity around Greeley may contribute to the 
surprising similar perceptions across communities. Our Fort Collins sample is also likely to 
include individuals who work in managerial and engineering sectors of the O&G industry, such 
as engineering and oil field services, which many engender similar levels of support.   
Theoretically, these findings highlight the power that free market ideology can have on 
individuals’ perceptions of environmental risks and appropriate regulations. In particular, 
neoliberalism’s main ideological tenets —free trade and unencumbered markets, de- and re-
regulation to promote free trade, shrinking social safety nets, weakening state capacities for 
governance, and the individualization of daily life (Harvey 2007)—have become increasingly 
hegemonic in U.S. policy and culture, since the early 1980s era of ‘Reaganomics’. We now have 
a generation of adults that were raised in a neoliberalized U.S., where privileging self-regulating 
markets has been the accepted norm. In the realm of political discourse, this perspective has 
become so normative and hegemonic that to question the logic of free markets is to be anti-
American or anti-freedom. Indeed, Block and Somers (2014) maintain and display that the core 
assumptions of neoliberalism are rarely challenged.  
Our results show that these new ideological norms may help displace support for the double 
movement Polanyi observed and help create space for a ‘triple movement’ – fundamentally 
different from the double movement in its support for privileging self-regulating (disembedded) 
market systems. We argue that, while the double movement still thrives, a triple movement now 
exists alongside it, as the public may generally trust corporations to self-regulate, privilege 
market-based economics, and distrust state regulators. Hence, some members of the public 
support deregulation, even in the face of negative impacts, while others may organize for more 
protection from rapid O&G development.  
																																								 																																							 																																							 																																							 																																			
2014; Clarke et. al. 2015) and surveyed community leaders in areas with little active drilling (Crowe, 
Ceresola and Silva 2015).  
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The robust predictive power of free market ideology in the face of several control variables 
suggests that future research should more closely attend to how this impacts public demand for 
environmental protection as well as interrogations into the type and level of environmental 
protection preferred by various segments of the population. We see this as a crucial area of study, 
specifically teasing apart the extent to which energy policy regimes are increasingly informed by 
neoliberal ideas, even if and when the public may not fully embrace neoliberalism. Coupled with 
the ongoing lobby for market liberalism waged by business and industry, we may witness a 
steady march toward a weakened environmental state and normalization of the very variety of 
capitalism that Polanyi believed would be so devastating for citizens and the environment.    
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